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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RALPH BRUNYER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah corporation, and DANIEL NEIL IPSON,
No. 14267
Defendants, Appellants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
EMIL ZIGICH,
Third-Party Defendant
and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a consolidation of two cases brought by plaintiff
against defendants for the wrongful death of plaintiff's
wife and for personal injuries caused to plaintiff.

These

actions arose out of a collision between an automobile in
which plaintiff and his wife were riding as passengers and
an automobile owned by defendant Salt Lake County and driven
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2by defendant Ipson, Defendants filed a third-party complaint
against the driver Zigich seeking an adjudication of his
percentage of fault, if anyf and a contingent judgment for
contribution based upon this proportion,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Third-party defendant Zigich filed a Motion to Dismiss
defendants1 Third-Party Complaint,

This Motion was granted

by the Honorable Bryant H, Croft on September 16, 1975,
The District Court ruled that since the automobile accident
causing the injuries and death occurred before the Utah
Comparative Negligence Act, of which contribution is a part,
went into effect, the action was barred because the Act
was not retroactive to the date of the accident.

The court

also ruled that if contribution were in fact applicable
to this action the Third-Party Complaint was premature
since no payment had yet been made by the defendants in
excess of their pro rata share of liability.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the Revised Order of Dismissal
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as to third-party defendant and a remand to the lower court
for trial of this matter including the third-party claim for
contribution,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because this case has not yet gone to trial, the statement
of facts must be based upon the allegations contained in the
pleadings as set forth in the various parties.

However,

there is little factual dispute at this point in time.

In

the early morning hours of April 14, 19 73 Ralph Brunyer and
his wife Louise were riding as passengers in an automobile
driven by Emil Zigich.

The Brunyers and Mr. Zigich had

previously been attending a party at which time alcohol
was consumed by Mr. Zigich.
At approximately 1:15 a.m., while taking the Brunyers
back to their residence, the Zigich automobile was proceeding
south on Main Street and was making a left turn to Gregson
Avenue.

At this instance an automobile driven by Salt

Lake County Deputy Sheriff Ipson collided with the Zigich
automobile.
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4
Plaintiff Ralph Brunyer sustained personal injuries in
the accident and his wife Louise died a short time later of
injuries sustained from the accident,
Plaintiff Ralph Brunyer filed a complaint in the District
Court of Salt Lake (Civil No. 218616) seeking recovery on
behalf of the heirs of Louise M. Brunyer for her wrongful
death.

Shortly thereafter, he filed a second action in

the District Court (Civil No, 218644) seeking recovery
for his own personal injuries (R. 1-7).
On July 26, 1974 defendants made a motion to consolidate
the two actions which motion was granted by order of the
Honorable Gordon R, Hall on September 24, 1974 pursuant to
stipulation.

The two cases were thereafter consolidated

for all purposes (R. 23-24),
On May 14, 1975 defendants made their motion for leave
to file a third-party complaint against Emil Zigich, driver
of the automobile in which plaintiffs were riding.

This

motion was granted by an order of the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson, Jr., June 4, 1975 (R. 68-70).

On June 4, 1975 defendants

filed a third-party complaint against Emil Zigich seeking
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-5an apportionment of liability, if any, between the tortfeasors
and a judgment in contribution (R. 59-61).

The third-party

complaint alleged, inter alia, that Emil Zigich was intoxicated
at the time of the accident and was guilty of wilful misconduct.
Affidavits filed subsequent to this complaint stated that the
alcohol level in Zigich1s blood on the morning of the accident
was .07% alcohol (R. 95-96).
On June 27, 1975 Emil Zigich filed his motion to dismiss
the third-party complaint (R. 74-75).

This motion was granted

and a revised order of dismissal as to the third-party defendant
was entered on September 16, 1975 (R. 118-120).

It is from

this order that the present appeal is taken.
The Utah Contribution Statute Title 78, Chapter 27,
Section 39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Supp. 1975) was
enacted by the Utah State Legislature in 19 73 and became
effective sixty (60) days following the last day of the
legislative session, March 8, 1973.
POINT I
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THIS CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE
THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CONTRIBUTION
ACT BECAUSE THE "CAUSE OF ACTION" HAS NOT YET ACCRUED.
The trial court granted third-party defendant Zigich1s
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~6Motion to Dismiss on two grounds:

first, "that contribution

under the Utah Comparative Negligence Act is not retrospective
in application but prospective" and secondly "that if contribu
tion should apply to this situation, third-party plaintiff's
third-party complaint is premature,"

(R. 119-120,)

The trial court erred in its judgment based upon both
of the above reasons. This point will address itself solely
to the question of the application of the comparative negligence statute. The second point will be treated elsewhere
in this brief (Point III).
The 1973 Legislature enacted Chapter 209, Sections 1-7
concerning the doctrines of comparative negligence and contribution.

This act has now been codified in Title 78, Chapter

27, Section 37 through 43, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975).
The doctrine of comparative negligence, the relationship
between an injured party and the tortfeasor, is considerably
different from the doctrine of contribution, the relationship
between joint tortfeasors. The sole question in this case
concerns the effect of the contribution statutes upon Utah
law and does not deal with Sections 37 and 38 relating to
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comparative negligence.

The categorization by the trial

court's order of dismissal that the "Comparative Negligence
Act" is incorrect since the legislation clearly contains
two subject matters: comparative negligence and contribution.
Without elaborating, it suffices to say that comparative
negligence affects the defense an alleged tortfeasor may
have against a complaining plaintiff whereas contribution has
no effect whatsoever to the relationship of plaintiff and
tortfeasor. As will be developed throughout this brief,
this distinction is of crucial importance when dealing
with these two concepts.
Section 78-27-39 is the building block of the Utah
Contribution Statute.

It states:

The right of contribution shall exist among
joint tortfeasors, but a joint tortfeasor shall
not be entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the
common liability or more than his pro rata share
thereof.
Section 78-27-40 defines a joint tortfeasor as "one of two
or more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment
has been recovered against all or some of them."
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-Bi-

section states that "the relative degrees of fault of the
joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their
pro rata sharesf solely for the purpose of determining their
rights of contribution among themselves, each remaining
severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury
as at common law."
This statutory enactment clearly changes the previous
common law that contribution between joint tortfeasors was
not permissible.

Hardman v. Matthews, 1 Utah 2d 110, 262

P.2d 748 (1953). ,
The new law allows contribution to exist when one joint
tortfeasor has paid to a plaintiff a disproportionate share
of his adjudicated liability.

As before, however, the plaintiff

is in no way affected by this statute since he may still
opt to take the full judgment against any one joint tortfeasor
regardless of the relative degrees of fault among them.
Thus, as previously discussed, a plaintiff is in no way
restricted or damaged by the enactment of the contribution
statute.
The trial court categorized the contribution statute
(erroneously termed the Utah Comparative Negligence Act)
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as not "retrospective in application, but prospective" and
specifically stated that the "plaintiff's claim against the
defendants and third-party plaintiff arose as a result of
an accident which occurred on April 14, 1973, prior to the
effective date of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, to
wit:

May 8, 1973 (R. 119-120),
Thus, the simple chronological history upon which this

appeal turns is as follows:

the accident occurred on April

14, 1973; the contribution statutes were passed by the 1973
Legislature which adjourned on March 8, 19 73; the normal
60-day waiting period for a statute to become law placed
the effective date of enactment to May 8, 19 73; the original
complaint was filed by plaintiff on April 4, 1974 (R. 3);
finally, the motion for leave to file a third-party complaint
was made on May 13, 19 75 (R. 45-46) and was granted on June
4, 1975 (R. 68-69).

There has been no adjudication as to

the claims between plaintiff and defendants and no settlement
or releases have been made by any of the parties to this
action.
The trial court characterized the date of the accident
as the controlling time to determine the application of
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-10the contribution statute.

The trial court then continued

its reasoning by stating that the statute was not retroactive
and therefore did not apply to accidents preceding the
effective date of the statute.
The trial court erred in its characterization of the
contribution statute as retroactive since the acts giving rise
to the cause of action based upon contribution have not yet
occurred and cannot, therefore, be said to have predated the
enactment of the statute.
The trial court erred in its interpretation that the
date of the accident was the controlling fact as to what law
should be applied.

The correct rule which should have been

applied by the court is that the cause of action for contribution does not accrue until one joint tortfeasor has "b£ payment,
discharged the common liability or more than his pro rata
share thereof" (78-27-39) and as such, until defendants Salt Lake
County, Daniel Ipson or third-party defendant Emil Zigich
discharge payment for a higher share of their liability, no
act for contribution exists. This "act" of payment is the
final condition which ripens the right to contribution into
a viable and enforceable right to judgment.
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-11Th e case of Silver King Coalition Mines Company v.
Industrial Commission. 2 Utah 2d 1. 268 P.2d 689 (1954). is
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extremely analagous to the instant case.

'

In that case the

employer of a deceased workman had appealed to this court
from an award of the Industrial Commission which gave to the
workman's widow certain benefits derived from the Workmen's
Compensation and Occupational Disease Act,

Just as in this

case, the chronological order of events was crucial: the
decedent was employed with the Silver King Coalition Mine
Company from 1938 to 1949, He died in the Utah State Tuberculosis
Sanitorium in 1952, a little more than three years after
leaving that employment.

Prior to 1951, a statute was in

effect that no compensation would be paid for the death from
silicosis "unless the death results within two years from
the last day upon which the employee actually worked."

In

1951 this section was amended adding a new provision which
extended this time period to five years from the last day
worked in those cases where death "results from silicosis
complicated by active tuberculosis and such silico-tuberculosis
is evidenced by positive laboratory sputum tests and x-rays
and other clinical findings."
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12The employer argued that its liability arose out of
the employee-employer relationship maintained with the
deceased and that its duties were fixed at the date of last
exposure to silicious dust.

The employer further argued

that the fact the workman did not die with the two-year
period fixed as a condition precedent to recovery under the
original act exonerated it from any obligation and that the
subsequent amendment could not be applied retroactively*
This court rejected the employer's argument and held
that the statute did not have to be applied retroactively
even though its application depended upon facts occurring
prior to the enactment of the amended statute.

The court

said:
Recognizing the fact that a cause of action
for the dependents of a deceased workman requires
that the cause of death originated in an injury
or disease compensible under the Act, our inquiry
must turn to whether or not the application of
the present statute would give retroactive effect
to that statute. Although it is an independent
right of action, an unqualified right to death
benefits does not arise either at the time of the
injury or last exposure or at the death of the
employee. At the time of the last exposure, it
is a potential right of action which may or may
not mature into an enforceable cause of action,
depending upon the happening of conditions subsequent. * * * * The death of Glade Mitchell was
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-13the last event which completed a cause of action
in his dependents,
A statute is not made retroactive merely
because it draws on antecedent facts for its
operation.
»
*

*

*

Whether or not the amendment would apply to the
workman1s claim is not here decided; the cause
of action of his dependents had not yet arisen,
even though the greater part of the incidents
necessary to the maintenance of the action had
occurred, and thus the statute applies to them.
* * * [Ijnasmuch as the amendment here is
applied to a cause of action coming into existence
after the effective date and no vested right falls
to the application of the statute, we hold that it
is not retroactive in its effect. 268 P.2d 691-693.
(Emphasis added.)
. , . •
The accident in this case occurring before the enactment
of the Contribution Statute is similar to the working and
last exposure of the decedent in Silver King Coalition
Mines. Both acts created a potential right of action which
may or may not have matured into an enforceable cause of
action depending upon the happening of conditions subsequent.
In

Silver King it required the death of the decedent from

certain causes within a certain period of time.

In this

case it requires the payment by a joint tortfeasor in excess
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-14of his common liability or pro rata share.

If this excess

payment does not occur, then the cause of action for contribution does not accrue and defendants in this case would not
have the right to seek a money judgment from the third-party
defendant.

Thus, an action to enforce a judgment based upon

contribution cannot be maintained until the conclusion of
the present action between plaintiff and defendants and then
only contingently depending upon the outcome of this litigation.
These "conditions subsequent11 remove the contribution statute
from any question of retroactivity as to those payments made
subsequent to the enactment of the statute. Therefore, the
trial court's determination that the date of the accident
was controlling is clearly erroneous.
Because this important question of application has never
been decided by this court and because of the great importance
this decision will have upon other litigation now pending,
appellants have surveyed the other states facing similar
problems and believe that the results obtained clearly show
that the prevailing rule is that the date of judgment
or payment of a disproportionate share of liability must
control in deciding the application of a contribution statute.
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-15While there are cases to the contrary in other jurisdictions,
the following cases represent the majority view concerning
application of newly-passed contribution statutes.
CALIFORNIA
In 1959 a lower appellate court in Hudson v. Hutchason,
340 P.2d 756 (App. Div. Cal. 1959), interpreted the enacting
clause of the contribution statute in California.

The

clause stated that the contribution procedure would apply
to "causes of action occurring on or after January 1, 1958."
The appellant maintained that the cause of action arose when
the joint tortfeasor discharged the entire judgment or paid
more than his pro rata share as defined in the statute. The
respondent argued that the date of tort liability controlled.
The appellate court held that "cause of action" referred to
the discharge of the obligation and not to the date of original
tortious conduct.

In 1961 the Supreme Court of California in

Augustus v. Bean, 363 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1961), affirmed the
Hudson decision.

The court stated:

^m^gmmmmmmmmmmmmm

The statutory system for contribution does
not concern the relationship of tortfeasors to the
one injured but deals with the relationships of
tortfeasors to each other when, after entry of
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judgment, one of them discharges the common
liability* In such a system it is clear that
the important consideration is when the judgment
is entered and payment made to the injured party,
not the date of the tort. Id. at 874.
DELAWARE
The Supreme Court of Delaware in Halifax Chick Express
v. Young, 137 A.2d 743 CDel, 1958), rejected a lower courtfs
decision that the contribution act applied only to cases
arising from torts committed after the date of its passage.
The Delaware Supreme Court stated:

"It is the discharge of

the common liability that gives rise to the right of contribution; not the commission of a tort."

Icl. at 745.

HAWAII
In Albert v. Dietz, 283 P. Supp.

854 (D. Hawaii 1968),

a diversity suit was brought against a golf professional for
damages allegedly arising out of an accident involving a golf
cart.

The golf professional moved to implead as a third-party

defendant the county which allegedly owned and operated the
golf course . The county attempted to escape liability on
the theory that no presentation of claim had been made within
the six-month statutory limit from the date of the plaintiff's
injuries.

The Federal District Court rejected this claim
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-17holding that the cause of action did not arise until the
payment by a joint tortfeasor had occurred.. The court quoted
with approval the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Western Casualty
& Surety Company v. Milwaukee G. C. Company. 251 N.W. 491
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(Wis. 1933), where that court stated:
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Logically, it would appear that the right
[to contribution] comes into being when the
combination of negligent acts gives force and
direction to events necessarily resulting in
an occasion for paying damages. This does not
depend upon action being begun. * * * It has
its inception at the time the negligence of the
alleged tortfeasors concurs to bring the injuries
to the third person. It springs up at that time,
and then and forever afterwards, until the claim
is outlawed, they or either of them are under a
liability to pay for injuries their negligent
acts have caused. This inchoate right ripens
into a cause of action when one of the joint
tortfeasors pays more than his proportionate
share of the claim for which all are liable.
(Emphasis added.)
The court relying upon this same reasoning held that the
county could not be dismissed as a third-party defendant.
IOWA
In the recent case of Dairyland Insurance Company v.
Mumert, 212 N.W. 2d 436 (Iowa 1973), a reverse situation
occurred illustrating again that payment rather than the
act itself is controlling.

In that case the plaintiff's
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insured purchased alcohol from the defendant in December of
1971 at which time the insured became intoxicated and collided
with another automobile owned by a third party.
contribution was in effect.

At that time,

On January 1, 1972, the Iowa

Legislature passed an amendment to Iowafs contribution statute
which prohibited an insurance company from seeking contribution from a vender of alcohol, A settlement was made with
the injured party on February 1, 1972 and payment made.
The lower court held that since the payment and settlement
was made subsequent to the restricting amendment the fact
that the accident had occurred prior to the amendment was
immaterial.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the lower court1s

decision and held that a claim against a joint tortfeasor
ripens into a cause of action only when one of the joint
tortfeasors pays more than his share of the claim for which
all are liable. Obviously, had the date of the tort been
controlling, the court would have allowed contribution on
behalf of the insurance carrier.
LOUISIANA
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in Brown v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Company, 142 So.2d 796 (La. 1962), faced a factual
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-19situation substantially identical to the instant case. In
this instance an accident occurred between a car being driven
by Brown and a truck operated by Jones,

Suits were brought

by passengers in the Brown automobile against Jones and Jones
sought to implead the driver Brown as a third-party defendant.
The lower court dismissed this third-party complaint and
was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. However,
the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that a third-party
action for contribution was proper.

The Supreme Court

characterized these decisions as being based upon the false
premise "that the rights of joint tortfeasors, as between
themselves, arise on the commission of the tort."
The Louisiana Supreme Court succinctly stated the
principle relied upon by appellant in the instant casei
It is true that as of that time the injured
party's right and cause of action against either
or both of two joint tortfeasors come into being;
and conversely, the obligation of each of the latter
to the claimant also commences. On the other hand,
the rights and obligations as between the joint
wrongdoers do not there arise because they are
not created by virtue of the commission of the
tort and of the provisions of the revised civil
code article 2315. Rather, they spring from the
principle of contribution, enunciated in Article
2103 and our jurisprudence, which is required of
solidary obligors when one has been compelled to
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-20pay the full amount of the obligation. And it
is only after judicial demand has been made on
one of two or more solidarily obligated tortfeasors
that he can have any possible interest in seeking
contribution*
»•»<!
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Therefore, herein, when the 1960 amendment
to revise civil code Article 2103 became effective
on January 1, 1961 there were no rights or obligation in esse as between (Jones) * * * on the one
hand, and the third-party action defendant (Brown)
(the instant suits were not filed until after that
date>) ; and, as a consequence, those codal provisions
could not possibly have affected any pre-existing
substantive rights as between such parties. From
which it falls that it is immaterial whether the
relief afforded by the 1960 amendment is substantive
or procedural.
The Brown decision was followed shortly thereafter in Caruso
•'""WW

Wiiwiim

-

"

v. New York Insurance Company, where the lower appellate
court held that the date of judicial demand was controlling
as to the right of a third-party plaintiff to demand and
obtain contribution from negligence which occurred prior
to the effective date of the contribution statute.

150 S,2d

337 (1965).
MARYLAND
In Southern Maryland Oil Company v. Texas Company, 203
i>m,jf

|i»mii.iiii

i • • iii.iiiM.if

HITIIIH 'U..WH •^)W^iwnii»u,iMiiij|nij»iiin,uuHi

fa.

umOi|»»i

'• ' " " •

i" *

P-"" ' I " " '

" * "

w.iffi

F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1962), the Federal Court in Maryland
held that under Maryland law the right to indemnification and
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-21to contribution, whether based upon contract or tort, accrues
at the time of the payment and not before.

The court held

that the statute of limitations began to run from the time
of settlement and not from the time of the original injury.
The court said:

"Thus we have here the assertion of alleged

rights that do not spring directly or solely from the act
of negligence.

Rather, these are derivative rights, which

remain inchoate and upon which no judgment could have been
obtained until after the various settlements or, had the
primary suits been resolved differently, until the claimants
there had obtained judgments which had been satisfied."
Id, at 42,
MISSISSIPPI
In Klaas v. Continental Southern Lines, 82 S,2d 705,
»"»••
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the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed a lower court's
determination that a contribution action could lie where
the judgment had been obtained before the contribution statute
went into effect.

The court held that the act only applied

to judgments entered after the effective date of the statute
and implied that the date of the tort was not material in
the determination of the statute's application.
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NEW JERSEY
Boi;h the New Jersey Legislature and the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated the rule which should be applied to
contribution statutes. The Legislature enacted New Jersey
Statute 2At53A-4 which stated:

"This statute is made

applicable to all actions for contribution commenced, and
to all judgments recovered, after the effective date" of
the enactment, "irrespective of the time of the commission
of the wrongful act or acts by the joint tortfeasors;
provided, that it shall not apply with respect to payments
made prior to the effective date,"

The Supreme Court of

New Jersey in the case of Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v.
"*
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Rosenthal, 102 A.2d 587 (N.J. 1954), emphasized again
that the payment is the controlling factor for a right
of contribution:
The statutory right of action for contribution
accrues only on the payment by a joint tortfeasor
of a money judgment recovered against him for the
injurious consequences of the wrong; and by clear
and imperative terms the right is enforceable as
to payments made on the underlying judgment after
the law came into being, even though the judgment
was entered before. The payment beyond the payer1s
pro rata share is the act which gives rise to the
statutory right of restitution. Id. at 591.
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(Emphasis added.)
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The Superior Court of New Jersey in Markey v. Skog,
322 A.2d 513 '(N.J. Super. 1974) , held that a governmental
entity could not be dismissed as a third-party defendant
for failure to give statutory notice from the time of the
tort when the controlling date is the payment by a joint
tortfeasor of more than his pro rata share.
NEW YORK
In Deuscher v. Cammerano, 176 N.E. Rptr. 412 (N.Y. Ct.
IMI%WU'"MI
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App. 1931) , the New York Court of Appeals held that the lower
court erred in ruling that a tortfeasor could not sue for
contribution against a joint tortfeasor for torts committed
prior to the enactment of the statute.

The court stated:

"To hold with the appellate division that Section 211-A only
applies to torts committed after its passage would have
left Cammerano liable for the full amount of the judgment
without any recourse over to his co-defendant."

The court

held that the right of contribution only accrues upon the
payment of an excess share of the liability.
PENNSYLVANIA
In Brenneis v. Marley, 5 D & C 2d 20 (Penn. D. Ct. 1955.)
'*"»')• n w n

imui inwt '.»i ' i i HI i jii I . I I M I mi u * !

r

the court in interpreting the Pennsylvania contribution
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statute nearly identical to Section 78-27-39 held that a
verdict rendered after the effective date of the Pennsylvania
act was subject to the contribution provisions even though
the tort giving rise to the action took place prior to the
statute's enactment.
VIRGINIA
The Federal District Court in Virginia in the case of
Laws v. Spain, 312 P. Supp, 315 (D. Vir. 1970), held that
the right to contribution arises only upon an unfair payment.
The court said:
The right to contribution arises when one joint
tortfeasor has paid a claim for which the other joint
tortfeasor is also liable. The right to maintain the
action for contribution need not be founded upon a
judgment determining the issues of negligence. It
may be based upon a compromise settlement, rather
than a judgment. But f the right to contribution
arises only when one tortfeasor has paid or settled
a claim for which the other wrongdoer is liable.
Id. at 318. (Emphasis added.)
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WISCONSIN
The Wisonsin court has held on several occasions that
while the right of contribution by the joint tortfeasors
arises at the time of the concurring independent acts, it
is not until one of the joint tortfeasors pays more than
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his proportionate share of the underlying claim that the right
ripens into a cause of action/

See Ainsworth v. Berg, 34

N.W. 2d 790 (Wis. 1 9 4 8 ) ; Western Casualty & Surety Company v.
Milwaukee G. C

Company, 251 N.W. 491 (Wis. 1933).

Other authorities are in agreement with the principle
that the cause of action for contribution does not accrue
until time of payment.

In American Jurisprudence 2d the

following statement is found:

"

While it is true that a common burden or
obligation resting upon the parties is essential
to the accrual of the right of contribution, no
cause of action therefor arises merely because
of the relationship of the parties or because of
the claimant's liability on such obligation. The
right to contribution is inchoate or subordinate
from the time of the creation of the relationship
giving rise to the common burden until the time
or payment by a co-obligor of more than his
proportional share, and as a rule, the right
to contribution becomes complete and enforceable
only upon a payment or its equivalent by the
' '"'"Claimant discharging, satisfying, or extinguishing
the whole or more than his just and equitable
share of the common obligation, provided the
obligation is due at the time. O r , stated in
terms applicable to actions at law, the implied
promise to contribute is considered as made at
the time the common liability is assumed, and
the right to sue thereon arises when a party has
paid or satisfied the whole of the obligation or
more than his share thereof. 18 Am. Jur. 2d,
Contribution, Section 9, p. 20-21.
(Emphasis
...... added.)
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-26Corpus Juris Secundum makes the following statement •
The right of contribution is inchoate front
the date of the creation of the relation between
the parties, but it is not complete, so as to
be enforceable until there has been an actual
payment, in whole or in part, of the common
obligation or until something is done equivalent
to a discharge thereof, 18 C.J.S. Contribution,
Section 4, p, 7.
(Emphasis added.)
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In summary, this court in the Silver King Coalition
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Mine case has clearly stated the rule that a statute is
not made retroactive merely because it draws on antecedent
facts for its operation.

The fact that the accident in this

case occurred prior to the enactment of the statute is
irrelevant to these defendants1 right of action in contribution
against the driver of the plaintiff's automobile/ Since
contribution is conditional upon the finding of joint
liability and upon the payment of a disproportionate share
of the obligation it is possible that the right of contribution
in this case may never accrue were the jury to find the
third-party defendant or the defendants themselves not liable
to the plaintiff or were the joint tortfeasors to pay their
proportionate share of any judgment obtained.
Defendants are not asking this court to award contribution.
Rather, defendants ask that the third-party defendant driver
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-27be impled into this action so that liability and proportion
of fault can be determined in one action and so that the
right of contribution can later be enforced if necessary.
As can be seen by the preceding survey of cases throughout
the country, this request is proper under Utah's new contribution statutes,
•f

."

:>

POINT II
»MWJg-,.f,'- v>m -vu«i.

THE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CONTRIBUTION STATUTES
DOES NOT TAKE AWAY OR IMPAIR VESTED RIGHTS ACQUIRED
UNDER EXISTING LAWS PRIOR TO ITS ENACTMENT, DOES NOT
CREATE A NEW OBLIGATION, DOES NOT IMPOSE A NEW DUTY,
AND DOES NOT ATTACH A NEW DISABILITY IN RESPECT TO
TRANSACTIONS OR CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY PASSED.
As previously discussed in Point I of this brief, the
cause of action for contribution, if any, will not accrue
until well after the passage of the contribution statute#
Therefore, the statute in this case would not be applied
retroactively.

However, even if it were assumed that some

retroactive application must occur to the date of the
accident, such application is permissible since no substantive
changes have occurred by the passage of this.act*
Again, the Silver King Coalition Mine case is controlling.
This court in that case stated:

,:
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-28A law is retrospective, in its legal sense,
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws or creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability
in respect to transactions or considerations already
passed, 268 P.2d at 692.
The court in ruling that the amended Occupational Disease
Act was not retrospective stated considerations which are
analagous to the instant case:
No new duty is imposed upon the employer by
applying the present statute, for the obligation
of paying compensation to the employee, if he
contracted the disease of silicosis, and to his
dependents if he died of silicosis, was, and
must be, contemplated in the formation of the
employee-employer relationship under the laws of
Utah. There was no time at which the employer
could maintain that a right to be free from this
liability had vested. This right must be contingent
upon the happening of conditions subsequent, an
expectation that the employee would not become
ill, that if he did become ill the Commission
would not make an award, that he would not die,
that if he did die he would not die within the
period prescribed by the statute. Certainly,
the employer could not maintain that his duties
were fixed at the time of employment not at the
death of the injury. * * * It is often said that
a right is not "vested" unless it is something
more than such a mere expectation as may be based
upon an anticipated continuation of the present
laws. * * * These courts (in other jurisdictions)
held that an act is not retroactive if it applies
to persons who presently possess a continuing
status even though a part of all of the requirements
to constitute it were fulfilled prior to the passage
of the act or amendments thereto. 268 P.2d at 692.
(Emphasis added.)
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-29Similarly, in the instant case, third-party defendant
Zigich cannot claim that there was a time that a right to
be free from his liability had vested.

This right to be

free from liability was contingent upon the happening of
conditions subsequent, an expectation that his passengers
would not bring a lawsuit against him, that if a lawsuit
was brought that he would be found not negligent, or that
a judgment would be enforced only against joint tortfeasors
and not himself.

These expectations were not "vested" at

the time the accident occurred.
The Supreme Court of Washington in Godfrey v. State,
530 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1975), held that the defense of comparative
negligence could be applied retroactively to accidents occurring
before the enactment of the statute. While as stated previously,
appellants believe that there is a distinction between comparative
negligence and contribution, it is obvious that if comparative
negligence can be applied retroactively then surely contribution
must also be applied.

In any event, the reasoning behind the

court's decision concerning vested rights is extremely applicable
to the application of contribution in this case.
stated:
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The court

-30Turning to the instant case, it must be noted
that respondent does not argue that it, or any
other defendant, would have relied on the common
law bar to recovery provided by contributory
negligence when committing the alleged tort of
negligence. It almost goes without saying that
the existence or lack of such an affirmative
defense had no effect on the everyday conduct
of individuals. Defendants do not act less
negligently or more so because of the presence
or absence of an affirmative defense of contributory negligence. One cannot have a vested right
in a tort defense the merits of which cannot be
determined until trial and upon which he does not
and cannot rely in the initial injury to a plaintiff.
Thus, we hold there is no vested right in the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. 530 P.2d
at 632.
(Emphasis added.)
a>
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Likewise, third-party defendant Zigich cannot claim
that he drove any less carefully upon the night of the
accident upon the assumption that there would be no
contribution between joint tortfeasors.

If anything,

Zigich should have driven more carefully thinking that
he would not be able to obtain contribution from any joint
tortfeasor.
The Supreme Court in California in Augustus v. Bean,
363 P.2d 873 stated:
Our construction of Section 880 does not
give rise to a problem of retroactive impairment
of a vested right. As of the time of the accident
a person did not have a vested right at common
law to avoid paying for the consequences of his
negligence merely because there were other tortDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-31•>••' feasors involved. After the entry of a judgment
against the joint tortfeasors, each of them was
liable in full until the judgment was satisfied
and, if the plaintiff chose to collect from one
•U- to the exclusion of another, this was a matter
of chance rather than the result of a right which
«- became fixed as of the time of the accident.
Contribution statutes, if applied where an accident
antedates their enactment, do not retroactively
increase the liability existing at the time of
1
the injury but merely provide a method by which
the liability of each of the tortfeasors may be
f:
limited to his pro rata share of the judgment,
363 P.2d at 874-75.
This court in Boucofski v. Jacobson, 104 Pac. 117
(Utah 1909) spoke of this "method referred to by the
California court.

The Utah court stated:

A remedy may be provided for existing rights,
a new remedy added to or substituted for those
which exist. Every case must, to a considerable
extent, depend on its own circumstances. General
words and remedial statutes may be applied to past
transactions and pending cases, according to all
indications of legislative intent, and this may
be greatly influenced by considerations of
convenience, reasonableness and justice. Statutes
enacted to promote and facilitate the administration
of justice are prominent in the category of remedial
statutes. Id. at 119-120.
The courts of Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Michigan
and New York have all held that contribution statutes such as
Utah's new act are remedial in nature and can be applied
retroactively regardless of when the action is said to accrue.
In Smith v. Fenner, 161 A.2d 150 (Penn. 1960), the
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-32court construed the Pennsylvania statute modeled from the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor Act as one of
procedure which did not disturb any substantive rights of
any of the defendants from which contribution was sought*
The courts in Delaware have held that the application of
the doctrine of contribution involves procedural or remedial
law and does not affect a substantive right. Halifax Chick
Express v. Young, 137 A.2d 743 (Del. 1958); Lutz v. Boas,
176 A.2d 853 (Ct. Chan. Del. 1961)•
The Supreme Court of New Jersey extensively examined
the remedial substantive argument in Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines v. Rosenthal, 102 A.2d 587 (N.J. 1954). and made the
• ' "j?jf

"•

•"

•

"""•'

•

"•"

following explanation as to why the contribution laws were
procedural and remedial:
The right of contribution arises out of a payment
in excess of the payer's just share of the common
obligation ensuing from a common wrongful act,
neglect or default—a change of policy equally
beneficial to all joint tortfeasors. The common
liability having been theretofore enforceable
against one or more less than all of the joint
offenders at the election of the injured person,
without the benefit of contribution, the enabling
statutes did not increase the liability of any
of the participants in the wrong but rather
lessened it by providing for a just distribution
of the common burden in lieu of the arbitrary
choice given to the injured person. The whole
responsibility cannot now be made to rest upon
one tortfeasor even though there are joint wrongDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-33doers able to bear it. It is but a change of
remedy without impairment of substantial rights.
The inequity emanating from the payment is the
thing redressed.
There is in the particular circumstances
no vested right to "protection against contribution «w Charging the joint tortfeasor with the
benefit accruing to him from the removal of the
common burden, according to equity and essential
justice, does not constitute a new or additional
obligation; quite the contrary. The joint wrongdoer does not have a vested right to the payment
thus made in his behalf by his co-tortfeasor.
The contribution law "has now remedied this
inequity and lessened a liability depending
upon the chance of the plaintiff's choice";
the inequity arises from the payment of the
joint wrongdoer's proportionate share of the
liability; his several liability for the
whole is "reduced to a pro rata share with
his" co-tortfeasor; the "change relates to
the remedy—to an unnecessary and unjust inequity
in procedure." 102 A.2d at 594. (Emphasis
added.)
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Michigan in an early
decision stated that it could see no reason why the legislature
may not, at any time before a wrongdoer has paid a judgment
against himself and others, provide that he may have contribution, though he did not have the same when the tort was
committed.

The Supreme Court stated:

"In our judgment,

such a change in the law relates only to the remedy.
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-34Finally, the Court of Appeals in New York, in Deuscher
v, Cammerano, 176 N.E. Rptr. 412 (Ct, App. N.Y. 1931), stated
the following:

"The effect of this amendment (the contribution

law) as to tortfeasors who are financially

responsible is

the same as if it changed the plaintiff's remedy in the
collection of a judgment by providing that each joint tortfeasor was liable only for his pro rata share of the judgment.
This would be a change in the remedy and affect no
substantial rights, at least create no new ones.

The same

result is accomplished by the provision that, if the
plaintiff collects all the judgment out of one, the other
must pay his share to that one."

Id., at 413.

(Emphasis

added.)
These cases, together with this court's holdings concerning vested rights and remedial law, clearly show that
a contribution statute does not deprive a defendant of any
"vested right" nor does it impose any new obligation, new
duty or impose a new disability upon any defendant which
did not otherwise exist. The fact that plaintiffs did
not choose to sue third-party defendant Zigich in the
original action was a matter of chance and did not involve
a "right."
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-35The application of the contribution statute was designed
to eliminate the inequity which would result in this case
were there no contribution statute. Here, without the
contribution statute, the driver of the plaintiff's automobile who is legally intoxicated escapes being named as
a party to the suit because he is a relative or friend
of the plaintiffs.

On the other hand, defendants are

named as parties and are asked to give plaintiffs the full
amount of their damages, if any, even though defendant's
conduct, if negligent, only partially contributed to the
accident.

If any "vested rights" can be claimed they

should be claimed by defendants since their right to equal
protection under the laws is left to the caprice of the
plaintiffs.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the Utah Contribution Statute is a legislative mandate to correct an inadequate
remedy and procedure which existed prior to its enactment
but does not affect any vested rights or create any new
obligations or disabilities which were not present prior to
its enactment.
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. POINT i n

:•

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRDPARTY COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE THIRD-PARTY
COMPLAINT WAS PREMATURE SINCE NO PAYMENT HAD BEEN
MADE IN EXCESS OF DEFENDANT'S PRO RATA SHARE OF
COMMON LIABILITY.
The trial court, in its order for dismissal, stated:
"If contribution should apply to this situation, third-party
plaintiff's Third-Party Complaint is premature in that
Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
does not create the third-party plaintiff's claim for
contribution until such time as third-party plaintiffs
have discharged more than their pro rata share of the
common liability."

v

From the court's order it is obvious that the court
determined that a third-party action was improper in any
case of contribution and that a second action should be
maintained by a joint tortfeasor only after payment of
a disproportionate share of a judgment had been made.
Thus, the court's decision would require two trials in
every case rather than efficiently joining both actions
into the plaintiff's original suit. While it is true that
the right to contribution does not accrue until the time
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-37of payment, the question of liability and pro rata share
may be determined prior to final payment since such a
determination is more efficient, more consistent, and
correctly gives a proportionate distribution between joint
tortfeasors.
Rule 14A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
"At any time after commencement of the action a defendant,
as third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint
to be served upon a person not a party to the action who
is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him.11

Obviously, this rule allows "premature"

judgments to be made pending the accrual of the right of
action.

Efficient judicial administration, effective representa-

tion of a joint tortfeasor, and efficient use of judicial
resources dictate that the logical method of proceeding in
most situations is to litigate the contribution issue in
the same lawsuit.
The New Jersey court has stated this doctrine as
follows:
The ascertion by co-defendants in a negligence
action of a right of contribution inter sese and
the right of a defendant to implead a joint tort-
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-38feasor by a third-party complaint before plaintiff's
cause of action has been reduced to a judgment are
merely devices of procedural convenience afforded
by the rules of practice. Thus, although a defendant
is not necessarily bound to proceed against joint
tortfeasors in the same action in which plaintiff
seeks to establish his (defendant's) liability, he
ordinarily will, nevertheless, do so because a
single action is the most orderly and logical
manner in which proof of common liability can be
established—and it is, of course, common liability
which is the substantive basis of the right of
contribution. Markey v. Skog, 322 A.2d 513 (Sup.
Ct. N.J. 1974). (Emphasis added.)
The contribution act itself contemplates that joint
tortfeasors should be tried in the same action.

Section

78-27-43 relating to the release of joint tortfeasors in
§2 states:

"This section shall apply only if the issue

of proportionate fault is litigated between joint tortfeasors
in the same action."

The term "same action" refers to the

original action filed by the plaintiff where all tortfeasors
can be adjudged negligent in their proportional share.
The third-party complaint in this case asks for an
adjudication of the percentage of negligence attributable
to third-party defendant Zigich and for a judgment in the
amount of that percentage as to the total verdict, if any,
returned by the jury.

While obviously any such judgment
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-39could not be enforced until a disproportionate payment
had been made by defendants to the plaintiffs, the adjudication
of the percentage of compability would eliminate any further
actions being filed where the same evidence would have to
be presented in order to determine the relative degree of
fault of each tortfeasor.

Surely, the efficient use of

judicial resources should not require two separate lawsuits
involving the same factual questions to be brought when one
lawsuit will effectively deal with all issues.
The trial court's determination that in no situation
could such an action be commenced prior to payment is clearly
in error as evidenced by the numerous suits throughout the
country involving adjudication of a third-party defendant's
liability prior to payment of a disproportionate share.
See e.g., Albert v. Dietz, 283 F. Supp. 854 (D. Hawaii 1968);
Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 142 S.2d 796 (La.
1962); Markey v. Skog, 322 A.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1974);
Dole v. Dowe Chemical Company, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Ct. App.
N.Y. 1972).
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''"; CONCLUSION

The trial courtfs order dismissing the third-party
complaint in this case is in error,

The trial court's

finding that the contribution statute is not retroactive
is immaterial since the cause of action for contribution
has not yet accrued because no payment has been made by a
joint tortfeasor in disproportion to his share of common
liability.

Even if it were assumed that some retroactive

application must be made, contrary to the great weight of
authority throughout the country, this third-party complaint
could still be maintained since the contribution statute
affects only a remedy or procedure and is not prohibited
by retroactive legislation.

Finallyf the trial court's

determination that if contribution did exist this action
was premature, is clearly erroneous since such a matter of
third-party practice concerns efficient judicial administration which should eliminate two identical trials being
necessary.
This case will establish an important precedent in
Utah law and will affect many cases presently in litigation
or about to be brought. The obvious legislative intent
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-41of the contribution statutes was to eliminate the inequities
existing under common law.

This court should consider these

objectives strongly and must interpret the statute to give
maximum benefits to joint tortfeasors who, except for the
enactment of the statute, would be forced to pay an inequitable
share of their adjudicated fault.
For these reasons, the order of the trial court dismissing
the third-party complaint must be reversed and remanded.
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